bodies, depends significantly on the institutional organization of public authority in a particular state.
In the scientific literature, a wide range of motives for "going to power" Weber defined the motivations for engaging in political activities as follows:
whoever "is active in politics strives for power either as a means in serving other aims, ideal or egoistic, or as «power for power's sake», that is, in order to enjoy the prestige-feeling that power gives" (Weber 1946: 2) . The specificity of such activities is that "on the one hand, it affects the politician, and on the other it is influenced by the personal qualities of the politicians" (Rakityansky 2008: 13).
The public administration system is much more formalized, and its rules are much clearer and set for it primarily on the legislative level. Therefore, it should be less affected by the personal qualities of the officials in the system, although such influence cannot be underestimated. However, the motivation for engaging in administrative activities seems to be largely similar to the motivation for engaging in political activity.
A wide range of motives for entering the public administration system exists, according to scientific sources, and includes both positive and negative motives in the sense of prosocial or non-prosocial orientation, but negative motivations are mainly accentuated in the works of modern researchers. Motives, both prosocial and non-prosocial, include greed, vanity, ambition, professional achievement, service, altruism, and their various combinations. However, it seems that the true motives of specific public officials are latent in nature and are not publicized. They can differ significantly from those that are articulated in open interviews, or even those that are reported in an impersonal questionnaire.
Nevertheless, it makes sense, although hypothetically, to assess how the influence of the dominant motives of aspiration to public power impacts the state of corruption in public authority.
The whole spectrum of motives for aspiring to public power can be divided into two segments that characterize the main types of motivation. The first segment of motives, having a predominantly prosocial, positive, and altruistic character, can be designated, in the terminology proposed by Francis Fukuyama, as "a desire for recognition" (Fukuyama 1992: 172) . This segment includes initially intangible motives, from achieving professional success to 'pure' altruism. However, as Talcott Parsons notes: …money, income, or wealth, i.e., resources convertible into or measurable in money terms, are, in an economy with a high development of monetary exchange, an important reward symbol. As such profit may be a measure of otherwise valued achievement acquisition, or it may be a direct goal of success-striving, so that other forms of achievement content become instrumental to monetary gain (Parsons 1991: 166).
The second segment of motives, which have a predominantly non-prosocial, negative-egoistic character, can be designated by analogy with the previous one as "greed for profit". This segment includes both material and initially intangible motives greed to ambition. At the same time, anyone who aspires to public power, driven by such motives, eventually comes to the goal of material enrichment even in those cases when the initial motive was the thirst for power and the passion for domination. Even "power for power" always inevitably engenders mercantile interests and is intertwined with a thirst for material wealth, an important symbol and indispensable attribute of domination over other people.
Everyone who aspires to public power, as a rule, has a set of motives from both segments and types of motivation, but in different proportions. This can be represented by a point on the conditional two-dimensional line of motivation shown in Figure 1 .
Figure 1: Line of Motivation
It seems fairly certain that those who come to public power who are motivated by gain from greed are significantly more inclined to engage in corrupt relations and adapt in a professional environment much easier with such attributes than those that are motivated by a thirst for recognition. The latter are, most often, rejected by a corrupt environment. Parsons pointed out that, at the same time, the profit motivated by desire cannot be reoriented to the thirst for recognition, not counting those situations in which the rise up the professional career ladder is one of a number of tools for profit. The reverse process of reorientation from a thirst for recognition to greed and a desire for profit is, unfortunately, possible. It is encountered in practice in societal conditions affected by the pandemic of corruption. This fact reflects a negative slope (negative first derivative) of the line of motivation, along which one can slip into a thirst for profit, self-interest, and greed, but one cannot rise from the desire for profit serve the cause and altruistic motivation.
The tendency toward corruption that is motivated by greed and a desire for profit appears to exist primarily due to the fact that, for such seekers of public 
Less inclination to corruption
More inclination to corruption positions of power, the principle "'the end justifies the means" is, if not quite the main principle, considered quite acceptable. Therefore, for personal gain and enrichment it is permissible and possible to use official powers and rights to distribute controlled resources in order to bypass the norms and rules established by normative legal acts, as well as moral and ethics norms. This is the institutional essence of corruption.
The motivation of activity in the system of public authority largely inherits and continues to motivate entry into public power, and also has a significant impact on the opportunities for the spread of corrupt behavior in this area.
From the viewpoint of the ability to influence the behavior of employees in order to increase the efficiency of the performance of their official duties, external motivation and an external locus of control seem more favorable. The collective solution of the functional tasks of the public authority in a corrupt environment can facilitate the active inclusion of a new employee in corruption relations and connections.
In particular, such external motivation as conformism can significantly aggravate the spread of corrupt behavior. When corrupt behavior is considered the norm, people become imbued with the ideas of their environment. Comparing themselves to their colleagues, they want to receive the same benefits that others receive. Here, the rule is 'If you can do it to others, then I also want it and I can do it.' Only individuals with a strong sense of self can overcome these manifestations, but it takes great effort. However, most people, unfortunately, do not have such independence, so their ideals can be changed under the influence of societal conditions. On the other hand, if the working environment is not a reference group for the employee, the appearance of a new employee can cause conflicts with colleagues and lead to the employee's dismissal.
In general, external motivation (the external locus of control) is the type of motivation for entry and activity in the system of public authority, which can serve as a basis for corrupt behavior. If the management of the affairs of the state is not valuable in itself, but serves only as an instrument for achieving other goals, it can reduce the quality and effectiveness of such activities and lead to the spread of corruption in the system of public authority. However, motivation not only negatively, but also positively, influences the performance of official duties and the counteraction of corruption in public authority. To this end, public officials should have high internal motivation and interest in managing the affairs of the state as a professional activity. At the same time, it is necessary to create conditions so that, in the course of their activities, public officials not only increase their professional skills, but also develop as a person. To achieve the latter goal, those who exercise public power must realize and understand their own motives (whatever they may be), and have the inner strength to be able to defend their point of view and the ability to perceive that of another.
POLTICIANS AND CORRUPTION
Is it possible to protect system of public authority from profit-motivated job seekers, or at least to minimize any damage they may cause, and to stop the spread of corruption in cases where such applicants enter power?
Of course, it is impossible to build ideal institutional barriers that completely and permanently protect the public authority from penetration of these individuals, or the activities of those who want to use it for their own selfish interests. Human nature is characterized by adaptability, the ability to find new ways and mechanisms to overcome any known and newly created barriers, especially on the ways in which to profit or for personal enrichment. At the same time, one should also take into account the fact that even now, free institutions of public authority under the influence of changes in the external and internal environment, including the human factor, can undergo erosion from corruption. From that it follows that the key role in the spread of corruption in the system of public authority is played by those who occupy, above all, the highest political positions of public authority, heads its institutions, and who form and implement the ruling political regime. Politicians, who occupy leading positions in the structures of public power, have a decisive influence on the extent to which corruption is used or not as a driving mechanism of political, economic, information, and other social processes. This is one of the most important characteristics of the ruling regime. Their attitude on corruption depends on how they came to power and what methods and means they use to retain and legitimize the power that the regime exercises.
As a rule, corruption becomes one of the dominant mechanisms for the function of the ruling regime, especially when power comes as a result of state or military coups, which is itself a specific form of political corruption. Indeed, when such mechanisms of power change occur, one part of the ruling class takes power from another, using "security" not for the struggle for power or law enforcement agencies and special services, which fully corresponds to the institutional essence of corruption.
Those who want to use power in their own mercenary interests can take political positions in the public authority, and do so in full accordance with the constitutionally established and legally regulated procedure for its formation and, above all, as a result of free and fair elections. However, during the privatization of public power and the creation of the ruling regime necessary for them to realize their selfish interests, such figures will necessarily use political corruption to retain and legitimize their power while, as a rule, initiating the observance of the constitutional order for the formation of public power.
The constitutional procedure for the formation of public authority, the implementation of which is regulated at the legislative level, is a normatively established mechanism for the acquisition and retention of public power by political actors, which is a decisive influence on the typology of its legitimacy. It The source of such rational (structural) legitimacy of political power (Weber 1978; Easton 1965) is the recognition by the people of the rational procedures, rules, and norms on the basis of which such power is forms and acts, i.e., this type of legitimacy has a normative basis. Therefore, it seems appropriate to designate this type of legitimacy as rational-normative. For most modern states, the mechanism of elections, which is used for this purpose differently depending on the type of ruling political regime, is called upon to serve as a the dominant mechanisms for the formation of public power and its rational-normative legitimation. This is to, in part, to what Fukuyama notes was "a growing belief that democracy was the only legitimate source of authority in the modern world…even the most die-hard dictators believed that they had to endow themselves with at least a patina of democratic legitimacy by staging an election" (Fukuyama 1992: 21).
The normative procedure for the formation of public authority is determined by the form of government established by the constitution or other constitutional acts. The distribution of forms of government in 192 sovereign United Nations member states is shown in Figure 2 . In the context of practical implementation, the institution of elections is designated as "free, fair, and competitive elections" (Nisnevich 2012b). In such instrumental interpretation, this institution is universally recognized as a minimum necessary attribute of representative democracy. With a dichotomous approach to assessing the democratic character of sovereign states, an assessment of the state and quality of the implementation of the institution of elections is fundamentally binary in nature, in which free, fair, and competitive elections are either implemented precisely in this way, or there is another event that mimics elections.
Therefore, various arguments about the "partially" free, "relatively" honest, or "limited" competitive contests seem like logical nonsense.
The institute of free, fair, and competitive elections is the fundamental procedure for the formation of public power for states that are at least electoral democracies. In such states, the institution of elections serves as a key mechanism for acquiring (conquering) and retaining public power in order to replace political posts with competing political actors, as well as resolving political conflicts and crises. At the same time, it serves as the dominant mechanism for the rationalnormative legitimation of the ruling regime of the democratic type.
Modern authoritarian regimes, in which the republican forms of government serve as the constitutional basis for the functioning of public authority, use the institution of elections for fundamentally different purposes, and in another way.
Such regimes hold events that can only be conditionally called "elections", in order to preserve public power in the hands of ruling political actors and so that the results of the "elections" were determined in advanced exclusively in favor of the regime, while insuring the legality and appearance of "democratic" legitimacy of such events.
To solve such a two-fold problem, electoral corruption based on the misuse of various types of administrative resources of the public authority in the electoral process is used (Nisnevich 2012a). Striving for high fictitious indicators allows us to say that non-democratic regimes tend to give the events called "elections" the character of plebiscitary legitimation, but unlike similar events of communist regimes, doing so while preserving the appearance of competitiveness.
The power of election corruption is due to the fact that virtually all modern authoritarian regimes, with the exception of Singapore and to some extent authoritarian monarchies, are characterized by high level and systemic corruption that is generated as a matter of priority by those who hold political office in public authorities.
"PURIFICATION" OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY
Real and long-term suppression of corruption in states with authoritariantype ruling regimes is impossible without political surgery, and without changing the ruling regimes that are organically incapable of self-reform and selfpurification, which are based on political corruption and which inevitable breed and promote the prosperity of all types of corruption.
The primary task of changing the authoritarian-type ruling regime should be to launch and ensure the sustainable operation of free, fair, and competitive elections, with mandatory replacement by results of not only elected, but also appointed, political public officials. This mechanism, together with activities in the period between the elections of the political opposition, provides for the political control of its activities outside of the public authority and acts as the key and most effective mechanism of political responsibility and combating corruption, primarily by political officials of public authority.
It should be emphasized that it isn't only the election of public officials that is needed, but also the replacement of all political public officials according to the results of the elections. This is fundamentally necessary because, with long irremovability of public officials, a regime arises to dominant power, to which systemic corruption is ontologically inherent (Carothers 2002) , acting as one of the dominant mechanisms for the functioning of such a regime.
After the change of the ruling totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, in which, as a rule, the whole system of public power is hit by corruption, in order to minimize the likelihood of the recurrence of this "cancerous tumor of social relations", it is essential to perform the fifth feat of Hercules. Namely, to clear the Augean stables of the public authority from the holders of the corrupt technology of public administration, who seized, under the previous regime, not only all of the political posts, but also the majority of the public administrative posts.
To this end, lustration should be conducted, not so much for political reasons This study led to the conclusion that management lustration after the change of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes based on corruption serves to purify public authorities from those who hold corruption relations and state management practices, and is a favorable starting point for the subsequent implementation of the set of measures necessary to counter corruption.
INSTITUTIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION BARRIERS
Corruption afflicts more than states with authoritarian regimes.
Approximately half of the states that, following the results of UN (Klugman 2010) and Freedom House (Freedom in the World) research, are recognized as electoral democracies have a high level of corruption. And not only in such states, but also in democracies with more-or-less acceptable and even low levels of corruption there is constant external and internal control over the activities of public authorities using specific institutional measures to counter corruption. Indeed, a
thousand-year historical experience shows that corruption as a type of informal social practice is characterized by mimicry and adaptability, modification and complication of forms and manifestations in an effort to overcome the obstacles erected in its way.
One of the main preventative and systematic counteractions to corruption in the sphere of public authority is an increase in the "quality" of those who inhabit the institutions of public power and its staffing. Candidates, both for election and for appointment to political posts of public authorities, are usually members of teams led by party leaders who, along with party programs wrapped in election packaging, are put on the political market in exchange for votes. Therefore, the parties should, as a matter of priority, bear political responsibility to voters for their professionalism, preparedness to manage the affairs of the state, and the moral and ethical qualities of their candidates (Nisnevich 2013).
With regard to elected public officials, the United Nations Convention secondary, and higher education should be a part of the solution to this problem.
CONCLUSION
The decisive role in the spread of corruption in the sphere of public power is played by the human factor. And, above all, the motivation for those who are trying to get into public power "populate" its institutions. It is personal motivation that determines whether or not public officials are predisposed to corruption relations, and their propensity to conformism or non-conformism in relation to manifestations of corruption in their ruling environment. Therefore, in order to counteract the spread of corruption in the sphere of public authority, it is necessary to "erect" institutional barriers to protect public authorities against the penetration and activities of those who want to use it for their own mercenary interests.
After the change of authoritarian regimes, of which one of the basic mechanisms of functioning is corruption, favorable conditions for "erecting"
institutional anti-corruption barriers can be created by managerial lustration, which facilitates the purification of the system of public authority of the holders of corruption relations and state management practices. With regard to elected public officials, the key practical measure of counteraction and suppression of corruption is the strengthening of fair and transparent political competition in elections to public authorities, and increasing the political responsibility of voters when they make decisions in elections. 
